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Short-Circuiting Legal Guidance in the Digital
Age: An Evaluation of Inadequate Protections
for the First and Fourth Amendments, and the
Electronic Communication Privacy Act
Audrey Lorene Leeder*
I. A CRIPPLING EFFECT OCCURS WHEN LAWS THAT
GOVERN ADVANCE TECHNOLOGICAL CELLULAR
PHONE SURVEILLANCE ARE INSUFFICIENT
"The first rule of any technology . . . is that automation applied to an
efficient operation will magnify the efficiency. The second [rule] is that auto-
mation applied to an inefficient operation will magnify the inefficiency."'
This quote from Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft Corporation, summarizes
not only a very important principle about how technology is made, but also
how society's laws can affect how technology is used within the sphere of
law. The United States' advancement of, and reliance on, technology has
revealed the inefficiencies of the laws that govern its use.
The U.S. Constitution was enacted to ensure that freedoms essential to
fostering a successful democratic society were protected. For over 200 years,
the Constitution has persevered through the issues facing the American pub-
lic. History has shown that one of the main strengths of the Constitution is its
constant and unfolding nature. This stability has provided a strong foundation
to rely on during our nation's weakest times, though some critics argue that
this "constant and consistent" nature can be construed as rigid and inflexible.
However, this critique ignores the fact that the Constitution was created in a
time when America faced issues that are drastically different from the ones it
faces today.
The American way of life has changed dramatically in the last 200 years
due in large part to technological advancements. For example, things that did
not exist when the Constitution was written are now viewed as essential parts
of a habitable home; such items include light bulbs, electric stoves, air condi-
tioning, and, importantly, cell phones. In this respect, the Constitution has
encountered difficulties when adapting to this new view of life. This diffi-
culty is particularly evident when applying Constitutional principles to cellu-
lar technology. Cellular phones have become a necessary aspect of American
living. In fact, the federal government recognized the necessity of cellular
* Audrey L. Leeder is a 2016 candidate for Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman
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phones when it enacted the Lifeline Program; a plan that provides discounted
cellular phones to impoverished citizens.2 Since cellular phones have become
an essential part of communication, there must be laws that control the Gov-
ernment's surveillance of their private use. Establishing new laws are neces-
sary to guarantee the protection of users' constitutional rights.
Currently, the federal government is relatively uninhibited in its surveil-
lance capabilities with regard to cellular phones. As a result, the federal gov-
ernment freely utilizes this power to perform intimate searches of an
individual's personal life. This invasion directly infringes upon the First and
Fourth Amendment, as well as statutory protections. As a remedy to these
invasions, this comment urges the need for a new statute regarding cell phone
privacy that better protects citizens' First and Fourth Amendment rights. This
statute must be more direct and effective than the current "solution" that the
legislature has enacted; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act is insuf-
ficient to address these concerns. A failure to do so threatens the vitality of
First and Fourth Amendment rights by destroying the American public's se-
curity and trust in cellular phones.
The First and Fourth Amendments provide the most privacy protections
to cell phone users. The First Amendment cultivates and encourages the ex-
change of ideas by affording specific protections to one's speech and expres-
sion. It embraces an individual's right to speak freely without having to
worry about negative repercussions, and encourages an individual to associ-
ate with whomever he may choose. The Fourth Amendment also seeks to
prevent unjustified intrusions and overly invasive investigations by the Gov-
ernment. Unfortunately, and contrary to the Founding Fathers' intentions,
these constitutional protections are consistently infringed upon by the
Government.
While the establishment of the First and Fourth Amendments eased the
Founders' concerns, these amendments have also led to oversights and vul-
nerabilities in the legal system by creating a false sense of security. However,
these constitutional protections do a disservice to the Founding Fathers' ideas
of protection of U.S. citizens. Our Founding Fathers envisioned a society
where citizens were free to exchange ideas freely and without fear of reprisal,
but because of the quick pace of the technological evolution in the United
States, our laws have not been able to adequately protect these rights.
Technological advancements provide an important service to our devel-
oping society. For example, the use of technology alleviated the limited com-
munication issue that plagued the American public. Things such as the
Internet and cell phones created instant communication, and along with it
provided a means for the Government to invade the lives of the American
public like never before. One of the main culprits of producing such vulnera-
bilities is tracking technology, which increased the Government's ability to
efficiently to collect an individual's cellular phone information. For instance,
2. Lifeline Program for Low-Income Consumers, FCC, http://www.fcc.govflife-
line (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
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global positioning systems (GPS) and subscriber identification module (SIM)
cards track an individual's location and store data information. Advanced
cellular phones, such as those with iPhone or Android platforms, have GPS
built into the phone to assist with locating your position and providing direc-
tions. This albeit convenient addition enhances the Government's ability to
closely monitor an individual's movements.
While GPS is commonly implemented in only advanced phones, older
phone users are not safe from the Government's invasive cellular phone
monitoring either. SIM cards are in nearly every phone in order to process
data. A SIM card provides a way to track an individual carrying any cellular
phone just as those that contain GPS. Because of these technologies, most
cellular phones are quite capable of tracking an individual's location through
technology that is already within the device and that has historically been
used to monitor individuals. Yet, Congress has not paid attention to the Gov-
ernment's use of this technology to surveil its citizens or to the constitutional
violations that might occur from such use.
A survey conducted for the purposes of this comment, which asked
whether the respondent would alter their choice of association if they knew
the Government had the ability to track their activities, revealed eye-opening
results. Nearly forty-percent of those surveyed stated that they would not
have behaved in the same manner had they known that the Government pos-
sessed the ability to track and search an innocent individual's cellular phone.3
Several of the respondents who stated that they would not alter their activity
believed that the Government was already tracking their activity. Based on
their responses, the overall number of individuals directly affected by the
Government's domestic surveillance through cellular phones is more than
forty-percent.
Additionally, the study revealed that nearly fifty-percent of respondents
between the ages of twenty-one and forty, expressed that they would not alter
their behavior. Given the pervasiveness of the technology in young adults it
is likely that the more engrained the use of a cellular phone is in an individ-
ual's life, the more he or she will trust the device and provider. This in turn
decreases the likelihood that the individual will believe the Government can
track his or her personal device. Accordingly, rising generations will be less
suspicious of the Government, less likely to question its motives, less likely
to protect themselves against invalid methods of surveillance, and more vul-
nerable to infringement. It is these precise individuals, who do not contem-
plate protecting themselves from the Government, that are in the most need
of adequate statutory protections. The survey findings also illustrate a statu-
tory gap; the individuals who need the most protection do not seek it. This
,mentality underlines a crucial vulnerability faced by the American public.
Without statutes that directly address the issue of cellular phone surveillance,
individuals will continue to disregard their constitutionally-protected right to
3. See infra Appendix A. The Survey polled thirty-one individuals between the
ages of twenty-one and seventy-seven.
2015] 345
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
both associate without government intrusion, and to prevent unjustified med-
dling into their private lives.
A cellular phone has the potential to hold more private and intimate
information than any other single item seized from a governmental search.
An intimate text message conversation between two individuals could fill
multiple diaries, day planners, or portfolio pages. Cellular phones are suscep-
tible to unconstitutional government surveillance. Currently, there is no ade-
quate law in place to monitor and limit the Government's ability to take
advantage of the vulnerabilities our society has created through our reliance
on technology. A potential solution to this issue is to incorporate the policies
that underlie First and Fourth Amendment protections through legislation.
Attention to First Amendment values would alleviate privacy concerns pro-
duced by cellular phone surveillance by limiting the Government's ability to
track and search to only those instances where an individual's constitution-
ally protected rights to free speech, expression, and association are not in-
fringed. Additionally, the spirit of the Fourth Amendment would limit
governmental invasions through a search and seizure analysis that applies to
the tracking of cellular location. These limitations would also reduce the chil-
ling of speech, an apparent fear, evidenced by the survey referenced above.
A. Roadmap to the First and Fourth Amendments' Infringement of
Cellular Phone Tracking and Data Invasion
This comment seeks to shed light on the invasion of cellular phone
tracking that has crept up on the American public. First, this comment will
address the historical background of the U.S. government's use of surveil-
lance. Generally, the history of the United States illustrates areas of weakness
from which the Government can learn from to prevent failing at similar is-
sues in the future. Second, this comment will draw on the uniquely analogous
issue of wiretapping surveillance for guidance in the proper procedures to
control cellular surveillance. The United States faced a similar issue to the
current cellular surveillance when it dealt with wiretap surveillance only
fifty-years earlier. Third, the Government's current use of tracking an indi-
vidual's cellular phone location and its implications will be analyzed. Fourth,
this comment will discuss the current laws prohibiting the Government's
ability to track cellular phones and search cellular phone data. Finally, a stat-
utory solution will be proposed to protect the future of America in the digital
age. Each section will be divided into subsections to further analyze the de-
tails of each area. These sections will highlight the natural extension and
necessary implementation of the First and Fourth Amendments in a new stat-
ute. The First and Fourth Amendments, federal statutes, and judicial prece-
dent will provide the foundation for a functional, efficient, and necessary




II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S USE OF
SURVEILLANCE
Historically, the Constitution was adapted in an attempt to restrict the
federal government's ability to invade an individual's personal information.4
Although the federal government uses its surveillance powers to legitimate
ends, such as the executive branch's use of citizen surveillance,5 cellular
phones have increased the Government's ability to surveil by creating a more
accessible method of collection. The accessibility of data on a person's
cellphone is problematic because it has become an efficient means to dis-
tribute this private information to third parties.6
The modern American citizen is likely screened by the Government on a
daily basis. Surveillance techniques permeate the average American's life-
benign trips to the supermarket are captured by security cameras; every call
and text from a cellular phone is recorded and processed. The federal govern-
ment can easily acquire a citizen's communication information through cellu-
lar phone call records, as well as GPS and SIM card tracking. This section
will address the issue of increased surveillance over the past 200 years.
American surveillance can be separated into two distinct eras: (1) the era of
government limitation and suppression; and (2) the era of acceptance of gov-
ernment surveillance.
A. The Era of Government Limitation and Suppression of
Surveillance
Prior to the 20th century, the Government's surveillance of the public
was limited to national security purposes during times of war.7 For instance,
during the Revolutionary War, the Committee for Detecting and Defeating
Conspiracies gathered information from suspected British spies and support-
ers.8 Additionally, during the Continental Congress, members stole and read
mail addressed to the Tories.9 Finally, the Sons of Liberty advanced surveil-
lance techniques by collecting information for the revolutionists.IO Common
to all of these methods of surveillance in the early years of America was the
4. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment As Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 112, 113-14 (2007).
5. Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless
NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the
Fourth Amendment, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 147, 152 (2006).
6. Solove, supra note 4, at 114.
7. Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L.
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element of aiding in war efforts, and not a mere a desire to investigate citi-
zen's personal lives.
B. Pre-1900
While the United States had obtained several intelligence-gathering
streams within the first few years of independence, the end of the Revolu-
tionary War and the enactment of the Constitution stalled this progression.II
In 1865, Secretary of State William Seward attempted to counteract this stag-
nation by creating a surveillance network known as the Secret Service.12 The
Secret Service was created as a clandestine network, operating across the
United States and Canada.13 Shortly before the end of the Civil War, the
Confederacy also established a surveillance network, the Secret Service Bu-
reau, but its activities, shrouded in secrecy, vanished over time.14 As with the
end of the Revolutionary War, the end of the Civil War also experienced a
lull in surveillance advancements, despite the previous creation of the Secret
Service and Secret Service Bureau.15 This pattern of stagnation enforces the
idea the aim of surveillance pre-1900s was used almost exclusively during
times of hostility and war.
C. Post-1900
The Red Scarel6 further justified the use of surveillance to proactively
protect national security and quickly reestablished surveillance methods as a
priority.17 Since this time, for better or worse, Americans have lived with
constant surveillance.18 The decision to increase domestic surveillance cre-
ated a deep rift between the judicial and legislative branches, and the execu-
tive branch.19 The executive branch sought to expand its powers through an
11. Id.
12. Id. at 107-73.
13. Donahue, supra note 7, at 1073.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Red Scare, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/red-scare (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015) ("The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the
United States intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s, hysteria over the
perceived threat posed by Communists in the United States became known as
the Red Scare").
17. Donahue, supra note 7, at 1073.
18. See generally id. (detailing the history of surveillance in the United States).
19. Id. at 1073.
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increase in domestic surveillance, while Congress and the judiciary acted af-
firmatively to limit this expansion.20
However, after a decade of severe violence post-World War I, all three
branches of the federal government united to increase domestic surveillance
in an effort to ease the fighting.21 Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and J.
Edgar Hoover, the future director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), led this new drive for surveillance.22 Beginning in 1919 the federal
government, led by Palmer and Hoover, also intensified its surveillance ef-
forts.23 These efforts appeared to pay off when in a single day, and across 33
cities, the Government located and deported more than 4,000 undesirable
aliens who were believed to be communists.24 However, it was later revealed
that the raid was barely a drop in the bucket as more than 26,000 American
communists existed at that time.25
Technological advancements during the mid-1900s greatly enhanced the
Government's ability to monitor the public.26 Wiretaps were a monumental
advancement in surveillance.27 The inception of the telephone brought with it
the easily accessible and useful surveillance method of wiretapping a phone
to eavesdrop on its users. 28 Years after wiretapping was put into use the battle
between privacy and national security went public as a result of the United
States' public acknowledgment of the Government's use of clandestine
tracking.29
The executive branch was concerned with expanding its own powers
and continued to question the legislature's alternative motives. President Tru-
man worried about these potential alternative motives, established the Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) to oversee domestic surveillance.30 The
Government used wiretaps throughout the Cold War to monitor conversa-
tions in hopes of tracking Soviet membership.31 Wiretaps became a central
component of national and foreign surveillance.32 The NSA is now a massive
20. Id. "Congress barred the Department of Justice (DOJ) from employing Secret
Service in an intelligence-gathering function."
21. Id. at 107-74.
22. Id.
23. See Donahue, supra note 7, at 1073-74.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1074.
26. Id. at 1070.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Donahue, supra note 7, at 1076.
30. Id. at 1080.
31. Id. at 1061, 1080.
32. Id. at 1072.
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infrastructure that consumes a large share of the estimated $40 billion dollars
budgeted annually for U.S. intelligence. 33
The U.S. Supreme Court later limited the invasion of wiretaps into
Americans' lives by requiring warrants for domestic intelligence surveil-
lance.34 In United States v. United States District Court, the Court stated:
"the price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an
unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official
eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of government
action in private conversation."35 In this case, the Supreme Court recognized
the First Amendment implications of monitoring Americans' domestic activi-
ties by directly referencing concerns of chilling "vigorous citizen dissent and
discussion of government action." 36
However, it became apparent that the NSA did not plan on adhering to
this holding when it continued to conduct illegal domestic spying.37 The NSA
surveillance monitored millions of domestic and foreign telegrams.38 As a
response to the NSA's defiance of judicial precedent, Congress created the
"Church Committee," which recommended legislative reform on domestic
surveillance.39 The Church Committee analyzed and compiled reports regard-
ing the federal government's domestic surveillance procedures.40 The Church
Committee "reported that there was 'frequent testimony that the law, and the
Constitution were simply ignored' and that there was a 'general attitude that
intelligence needs were responsive to a higher law,' namely, 'national
security.' "41
The Church Committee alleged in their reports that government surveil-
lance conducted in the name of national security was a ruse used to cover the
actual reason for the surveillance-political control.42 For example, President
Johnson at one point requested information regarding individuals' political
associations.43 The Church Committee's findings stated that in fact a sub-
33. Bloom & Dunn, supra note 5, at 153.
34. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972).
35. Id. at 314.
36. Id.
37. Nicholas C. Dranias, The Patriot Act of 2001 Versus the 1976 Church Commit-
tee Report: An Unavoidable Clash of Fundamental Policy Judgments, 17 CHI.
B. Ass'N REC. 28, 28-30 (2003).





43. Dranias, supra note 37, at 30.
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stantial portion of the surveillance for the purposes of obtaining political
information; national security concerns were just an added benefit.44
Due to the startling revelations regarding the Government's deception,
the Church Committee felt it necessary to make a serious change. In an at-
tempt to make such a monumental change, its final report recommended that
Congress take action to enact a "clearly defined and effectively controlled
domestic intelligence capability, which included the establishment of various
legal barriers between foreign and domestic intelligence agencies."45 "[T]he
unifying principle underlying [the Church Committee's] recommendations
was the recognition of the 'fundamental' need to protect American citizens
from intelligence gathering based predominantly on their domestic First
Amendment activities."46 Unfortunately, there was little action taken on the
Church Committee's recommendations,47 and the Government was essen-
tially returned to the pre-committee state.
Because the Church Committee had little effect, in 1978 the Senate once
again acknowledged the need to limit government surveillance by enacting
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).48 Particularly, FISA reiter-
ated the Supreme Court's requirement from United States v. United States
District Court requiring government entities to acquire a warrant before
eavesdropping on private conversations.49 FISA remained the central entity
that limited the Government's surveillance methods until the twenty-first
century and still retains a considerable amount of control. Up until 2001,
both the judiciary and legislature feared the Government's surveillance tech-
niques because they were thought of as an over-expansion of the executive
branch's powers as well as an invasion of private matters.50 This fear carried
persisted until our nation's worries were set on directed to international ene-
mies, reviving the expansion of domestic surveillance.
D. The Era of the Public's Acceptance of Government Surveillance
September 11, 2001, a day that will forever be engrained in the soul of
America, changed citizens' views of surveillance and set an unprecedented
acceptance of surveillance techniques. The terrorist attacks on September II
created a culture shift; Americans began to appreciate, accept, and even de-
sire domestic surveillance. The rift that existed between the branches of the
federal government seemed to vanish after the attacks.5i One of the worst
44. Id.
45. Id. (internal citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1092.
48. Id. at 1094.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1073.
51. Id. at 1101.
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moments in American history, a moment that ripped hope from millions of
American's hearts, also opened their eyes and locked their sights on prevent-
ing terrorism. This hatred set forth an anti-terrorism program centered on
both domestic and foreign surveillance.52
Riding this wave of patriotism, President Bush established the NSA Do-
mestic Spying Program, which allowed the Government to eavesdrop on do-
mestic phone calls.53 Subsequently, in late 2002, telecommunication
companies, including AT&T, BellSouth, and Verizon, voluntarily entered
into agreements with the NSA, releasing mass quantities of their customers'
cellular phone usage information to the Government, in the name of national
security.54 This voluntary disclosure is authorized by statute: a provider may
release consumer information to the Government if the provider believes the
Government requires the information for an emergency involving the danger
of death, or serious injury to a person.55 However, these customers were
never informed of the provider's ability to, in good or bad faith, grant the
Government access to their private information. Indeed, like any boilerplate
contractual agreement, the number of consumers who actually understood
that their contract with their cell phone provider condoned government
eavesdropping is low.
Governmental eavesdropping on domestic and foreign conversations
continued until October 2011, when a FISA court found part of the NSA's
surveillance program unconstitutional.56 Subsequently, the Government ad-
mitted to the unconstitutionality of some of the monitoring procedures, while
defending and continuing to use others.57 Although the court did not find that
the collection of the public's data was unconstitutional, in dicta, the court
criticized and expressed that it did not condone this technique.58 Thus, with-
out further limitations, the collection of calling records persists today.59 Still,
it is reasonable to infer from the court's decision that the court would con-
done a law limiting the collection of data.
Over the last decade, Americans have come to expect surveillance of
daily conversations and "Big Brother's" constant, watchful eye on their pri-
vate activities. For instance, while facial recognition cameras once existed
only in science-fiction movies, they are now an essential part of major metro-
politan surveillance. This acceptance of technological invasion has laid a
52. G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy,
59 Loy. L. REV. 861, 877-78 (2013).
53. Id. at 878, 882.
54. Id. at 882.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) (2015).
56. See Sinha, supra note 52, at 897-98.
57. See id. at 927, 935-36.
58. Id. at 898.
59. See id. at 898-99.
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foundation for further intrusion into an individual's life via cellular phone
tracking and data invasion.
Though the landscape of surveillance has drastically changed in the last
fifty years, the laws remain fairly the same. A once accepted method of pro-
tection has evolved into a different monster. To protect our society's closely
held belief in privacy and free expression, the inadequacies of the First and
Fourth Amendment, current statutory law, and judicial precedent must be
addressed. Congress must seriously consider enacting new statutes to reform
these issues.
III. THE ANALOGOUS ISSUE OF WIRETAPPING
SURVEILLANCE IN RELATION TO CELLULAR PHONE
SURVEILLANCE
The First and Fourth Amendments issues encountered with wiretapping
are analogous to the issue of cellular phone surveillance. Wiretapping is a
form of domestic surveillance that is relied on by the federal government
with little thought as to the effect it has on the American public. The execu-
tive branch used wiretaps as an essential surveillance technique with few
limitations until the judiciary and legislature attempted to implement regula-
tions and statutes. 60 However, these attempts by Congress and the Supreme
Court to control the executive were mostly ignored.61 Eventually, Congress
and the Court were able to reign over the executive by placing successful
limitations on wiretaps.62 The history of wiretapping provides an example of
the proper steps that the Government should take to implement cellular
phone tracking without infringing on citizens' First and Fourth Amendment
rights.
Warrantless wiretapping began in 1931 when the FBI used wiretapping
to preserve national security.63 Wiretapping is a surveillance method that taps
into a telephone wire when two individuals are speaking and transmits the
conversation to a third party, enabling the that party to eavesdrop on the
conversation. The use of wiretapping was commonly unopposed for foreign
surveillance, but when it began to be used to spy on American citizens in the
mid-nineteenth century, it was not as easily accepted.64 The likely cause of
the adverse treatment of domestic wiretapping is that wiretapping implicates
First and Fourth Amendment concerns regarding invasion of privacy and
chilling of free speech.
60. Donohue, supra note 7, at 1067.
61. See id. at 1068.
62. See id. at 1069.
63. Sinha, supra note 52, at 869.
64. See id. at 873.
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The Supreme Court first ruled on the issue of wiretapping in 1928 in
Olmstead v. United States.65 In Olmstead, the defendant was charged with
liquor-related crimes during Prohibition.66 Specifically, he was charged with
leading a liquor distribution ring.67 The liquor distribution ring included sev-
eral stores across the United States and Canada.68 Due to the distance be-
tween these stores, the defendant was forced to conduct a majority of his
business over the telephone. 69 The federal government tapped into the defen-
dant's telephone conversations and subsequently obtained information that
directly led to his conviction.70 The defendant claimed a violation of his
Fourth Amendment right to privacy.7' The Court held that the Government
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the wiretap was a permissive
invasion because the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when the Gov-
ernment physically invades a citizen's tangible property.72 The Olmstead pre-
cedent practically eliminated a constitutional claim for illegal electronic
communication surveillance.
The Olmstead ruling created an era where the federal government per-
formed a slew of invasive wiretaps. For instance, during the 1930s, J. Edgar
Hoover pushed for secret wiretapping missions in response the national crisis
posed by Russia.73 Invasive wiretapping continued into the 1940s and 1950s
when Judith Coplon, a suspected Soviet, was arrested partially because of
evidence that was obtained through an illegal wiretap.74 Although the Court
took a stand against illegal wiretaps, the FBI continued to perform them.75
In the 1960s, the laws regarding wiretapping were as undeveloped as
today's area of law concerning cellular phone surveillance.76 In the 1960s,
the Government utilized wiretaps for domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens.
In addition, great tension existed between the federal branches regarding the
proper usage of wiretaps. To unify the branches, President Johnson published
a memorandum in 1965 banning the use of wiretaps, except for national se-
curity purposes. 77 This decision was momentous because by this time it was
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367 (1967).
66. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
67. See id. at 455-56.
68. Id. at 456.
69. Id. at 456-57.
70. Id. at 456.
71. Id. at 455.
72. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
73. Donohue, supra note 7, at 1075.
74. Id. at 1076.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1070.
77. Id. at 1077 n.83.
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common for Americans to use landline telephones, and as a result this deci-
sion greatly restricted the most successful method of surveillance
In 1967, the Court reevaluated its stance on electronic surveillance,
overruling its holding in Olmstead.78 In Katz v. United States, the defendant
used a public pay phone in Los Angeles to place wagers in Boston and
Miami, a direct violation of federal law.79 The federal government had previ-
ously placed a recording device on the telephone booth to record the defen-
dant's illegal gambling.8o The Government acquired enough evidence
through surveillance to convict the defendant of illegal gambling.81
The Court held that "what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."82
The Court replaced the interpretation of trespass under the Fourth Amend-
ment by defining it as a "breach of an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy."83 Under this analysis, it is not the location of the action that the
Court evaluates, but instead whether the individual's actions were intended to
be publicly or private.84
In its majority opinion, Justice Stewart expressed that the Fourth
Amendment applies in situations where the individual expects to have pri-
vacy, regardless of whether the physical location of the individual be public
or private.85 Therefore, the location itself does not determine the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the test lies on whether the individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opin-
ion, explained the public has a reasonable expectation of privacy from gov-
ernment surveillance.86 Accordingly, the use of a cellular phone in a public
place does not displace an individual's Fourth Amendment right to privacy
because it is the expectation of this right that courts must consider in the
analysis.
While the Court did not engage in a First Amendment analysis, it did
recognize the potential need to protect an individual's public speech.87 Under
the particular facts of this case, the defendant's freedom of speech would not
be protected. However, the Court's recognition of the potential link between
privacy and freedom of speech is important when analogizing cellular phone
78. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
79. Id. at 348.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 348-49.
82. Id. at 351.
83. Id. at 360-62.
84. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 360.
87. Id. at 351.
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surveillance. Cellular phone surveillance methods encompass a wider range
of an individual's speech than traditional wiretaps. This results in an even
greater link between cellular phone surveillance and freedom of speech con-
cerns than wiretapping.
In Katz, the Court also recognized that in times of national security the
benefit that a wiretap confers may supersede the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.88 An individual's right to a private conversation under the
Fourth Amendment is of paramount importance, and the only time it should
be violated is when national security is at stake.89 Although domestic wire-
taps were almost universally accepted for national security purposes, Con-
gress still felt that it was necessary to set legal boundaries that would limit
their use.90 The legislature was concerned about the executive branch's long-
standing use of illegal domestic wiretaps. The safe-guarding procedures Con-
gress imposed were a strong indication that self-governance had failed and
that regulation was necessary.
Congress acknowledged the executive branch's use of unconstitutional
wiretapping by enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act (Omnibus Act), which sets strict parameters for domestic wire-
tapping.91 These parameters require judicial authorization and define the cir-
cumstances in which the court may approve a warrant.92 The Omnibus Act
places restrictions on wiretaps, which include a probable cause requirement
and a relevant-to-the-crime requirement.93 Furthermore, the requesting of-
ficer must specify the person under surveillance in the warrant, the location,
a description of communications, the name of person requesting, and the
length of time.94 The act limits wiretaps to twenty-six specified crimes, in-
cluding "murder, kidnapping, extortion, gambling, counterfeiting, and drug[-
related crimes]-all, coincidentally activities associated with terrorist
organizations."95
In addition, the Omnibus Act increases the difficulty of obtaining a
wiretap to a level more demanding than regular search warrants. 96 In 1972,
the Court in United States v. United States District Court, held that warrant-
88. Id. at 359.
89. Donohue, supra note 7, at 1077.
90. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2014) (amending the Electronic Commu-
nications Protection Act (ECPA) and commonly known as the Wiretap Act).
91. See generally id.
92. See generally id.






less domestic wiretapping were not prohibited by the Omnibus Act.97 The
Court in U.S. District Court underlined the importance of freedom of expres-
sion, stating that "the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to
individual privacy and free expression" could not be preserved if the execu-
tive branch had the ability to control domestic wiretap surveillance.9 8 How-
ever, the Court's attempt to limit the executive's ability to control
surveillance failed, resulting in continued illegal domestic wiretaps without
regard to the U.S. District Court ruling.99
Wiretapping was the first technology to invade the American citizen's
daily life on a massive scale. In 1975, the Church Committee revealed the
Government's illegitimate use of wiretapsoo causing American citizens to
second-guess the federal government.' 0' Once the Government's unconstitu-
tional use of wiretapping was revealed, the Government was forced to re-
spond and find a workable solution. To solve this issue, the judiciary set
precedent to limit the president's domestic surveillance power, while Con-
gress acted to remedy the issue through legislation.102
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of wiretapping several
times. These rulings created a fully-analyzed history of legal and illegal wire-
tapping, which helped guide the Government's surveillance actions. The Su-
preme Court clarified that it would not allow unrestricted access via
wiretapping into the American public's life.103 As with cellular phone sur-
veillance today, wiretapping was the most invasive method of surveillance in
its day.104
The wiretapping rulings illustrate the Court's continued belief that the
Government's surveillance powers must be regulated. Without statutory limi-
tations to supplement the Constitution, the Government will continue to in-
fringe upon an individual's constitutional rights of speech and privacy. Both
the judicial and the legislative branches have taken necessary action to pre-
vent such an infringement,05 recognizing a tri-fold system of protection: the
Constitution, statutory restrictions, and judicial precedent. Due to the analo-
gous nature of wiretapping and cellular phone surveillance, it would be wise
to keep the tri-fold system in place to adequately evaluate cellular phone
surveillance and proposed solutions.
97. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972).
98. Id. at 298.
99. Donohue, supra note 7, at 1080.
100. Dranias, supra note 37, at 30.
101. See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1092.
102. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511; U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 321.
103. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 321.
104. See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1078-80.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2511; U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 298.
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IV. THE TECHNOLOGY USED IN CELLULAR PHONE
SURVEILLANCE
Cellular phones are inextricably intertwined in Americans' lives. In fact,
this intertwinement is so profound that cellular phones have practically be-
come a fifth appendage to many people. Indeed, a recent Pew Research sur-
vey found the ninety-one percent of Americans own cellular phones.106 There
are two main methods that the Government utilizes to track an individual's
cellular phone location: historical data collection and prospective data collec-
tion.107 Now that most of the public carries a cellular device that can track
location, new issues related to tracking individuals have arisen.
Acknowledging the suppression of the First and Fourth Amendments by
government tracking, Justice Sotomayor remarked, in her concurring opinion
of United States v. Jones, that "awareness that the Government may be
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. She further stated that
the Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private
aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse."108 Further, "GPS monitoring-by
making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of inti-
mate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered
discretion, chooses to track-may 'alter the relationship between citizen and
Government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.' "109
A. The Collection of an Individual's Location Through Historical
Location Data
The Court's fear that surveillance chills free speech is unprecedented.
Recent investigations have revealed that the Government is taking advantage
of the historically-low evidentiary bar to perform surveillance by tracking a
cellular phones location.o10 In 2011, approximately 1,300,000 requests from
law enforcement for cellular phone tracking were processed.' These re-
106. Lee Raine, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% ofAdults, PEw RESEARCH CENTER,
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-
91-of-adults/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
107. Andrew Crocker, Trackers That Make Phone Calls: Considering First Amend-
ment Protection for Location Data, 26 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 619, 625 (2013).
Notably, these methods do not take into consideration the Government's addi-
tional ability to track an individual through a website's IP address when using a
cellular phone's Internet. This technique is not considered because it is not
exclusive to cellular phones; any device with access to the Internet can be used
to trace the location of an individual through an IP address, whereas the collec-
tion of historical information and prospective data is specific to cellular phones.
108. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir.
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).




quests utilize a method that produces a "data dump" of location information
that encompasses a great amount of citizen's information by treating both
innocent individuals and suspects alike.112 A data dump occurs when the
Government obtains a valid warrant for a particular suspect that was in a
populated area at the time of the crime.13
This warrant is used by cops in order to obtain the location of a suspect
and of an innocent individual who happens to be in the vicinity of the suspect
at the time of the crime.114 "Cell sites automatically collect data during nor-
mal usage, cellular providers accumulate logs ('call detail records') linking
specific subscriber accounts, call and Internet connection data, and the near-
est cell sector or base station."'l5 These "records can, at the least, be used to
determine that a user is located within a certain radius of the cell site at a
specific date and time."I16 For example, if a suspect were believed to be at a
Ku Klux Klan meeting, a cellular data dump would reveal the suspect's loca-
tion and the location of all the attendees that had cellular phones.
Recently in Riley v. California, the Supreme Court stated that "location
information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct
someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around town
but also within a particular building."117 The Court recognized that cellular
phones enable the Government to track intimate details of an individual's
life, stating that "[b]efore cell phones, a search of a person was limited by
physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow
intrusion on privacy."118 Now, however, "a cell phone collects in one place
many distinct types of information-an address, a note, a prescription, a
bank statement, a video-that reveal much more in combination than any
isolated record."I19 In addition, "a cell phone's capacity allows even just one
type of information to convey far more than previously possible. The sum of
an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photo-
graphs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions."120 However, "the
same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a
112. Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions After United States v.
Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment "GPS Case", 65 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 529
(2013).
113. Id. at 515 (noting that the Jones case was only before the court because there
was not a valid warrant).
114. Crocker, supra note 107, at 627.
115. Id. at 625-26.
116. Id. at 626.
117. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
118. Id. at 2489.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
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wallet."21 Notably, "the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the
phone, or even earlier."22 While "[a] person might carry in his pocket a slip
of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones[,] he would not carry a record of all
his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would
routinely be kept on a phone."23
Finally, there is "an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell
phones but not physical records."24 "[P]rior to the digital age, people did not
typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they
went about their day. Now it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone,
with all that it contains, who is the exception."25 This potential invasion of
privacy is an obvious infringement upon the Fourth Amendment right to pri-
vacy and its underlying First Amendment concerns.1 26 The ability of the
Government to track an individual's text messages and emails directly relates
to the freedom of expression and speech.127
A data dump provides detailed location information about all the indi-
viduals within close proximity to the suspect, most of who will never know
of the invasion or have a chance to protest against it in court.1 2 8 A data dump
impinges upon an innocent individual's constitutional rights by treating them
as if they were criminals.129 Historical location tracking received its name
because this tracking is only retroactive and does not contemporaneously
monitor an individual's movements.o30 However, every time an individual's
cellular phone passes a cellular phone tower, the phone sends a notification
to the cellular phone tower and then to the provider alerting that the phone is
within the vicinity.131
Cellular tower dumps have the ability to reveal an enormous amount of
private details regarding an individual's communications and associations.132
Visualize the cellular tower as a bucket that is dipped into a pond of water
full of guppy fish that represent cellular phone users. The Government
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 2490 (emphasis added).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 2488-89.
127. Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amend-
ment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L.
REV. 465, 467 (Jan. 2015).
128. Priester, supra note 112, at 510.
129. Id.
130. Crocker, supra note 107, at 625-26.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 627.
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chooses to use a huge bucket that catches hundreds of guppies, while only
needing to catch one. The Government could choose a smaller bucket to cap-
ture the guppy, but a larger bucket is selected because there is no law limiting
the use of a large and over-encompassing bucket.1 33
It is human nature to want more for less. The Government logically fills
the larger bucket since current law does not limit the Government's ability to
collect information regarding a criminal investigation.134 This extreme oppor-
tunity for invasion into an innocent individual's private life and association
raises concern. It is not a matter of if, but when, the Government will use the
association information to its unfair advantage. For these reasons, Congress
and the Supreme Court must address this issue through the enactment of
statutes along with supporting judicial precedent.
B. The Detection of an Individual's Location Through Prospective
Data Collection
The second method that the Government currently uses to collect sur-
veillance through cellular phones is prospective location data.135 Prospective
location data is taken directly from the cellular phone provider.136 In contrast
to historic data collection, prospective data collection is conducted concur-
rently with collection of the user's location.137
Prospective data collection enables the Government to actively generate
and track an individual's movements. For instance, the Government will ask
the cellular phone provider to ping an individual's cellular phone to transmit
the device's location to the provider who will then transmit it to the Govern-
ment.1 38 The use of prospective data collection does not pose the issue of a
mass collection of individual locations like it is with cellular tower dumps.
However, the greatest disadvantage to prospective data collection is that it
requires that an entity know the cellular phone number and provider of the
individual. 139
C. The Creation of a Highly-Detailed Mosaic Image of an
Individual's Location Through the Use of Both Historic and
Prospective Data Collections
When the Government combines multiple data collections and retraces
an individual's steps, creating a detailed map of his whereabouts, a "mosaic
133. See infra Section V.
134. See infra Section V.
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map" results.140 This technique was discussed in United States v. Rigmaiden,
where the Government created a virtual map of the accused activities and
used this image to obtain a conviction at trial.141 The advanced mosaic map,
created by the combination of historical and prospective data, is shockingly
detailed and permits the Government knowledge of intimate, private commu-
nications and associations of the individual's life.142
Importantly, this specific procedure is reserved for criminal suspects.
However, it is possible to include innocent individuals' data into these data
maps by collecting data inaccurately or by the Government's use of the tech-
nology for an ulterior purpose.1 43 If this occurs then a mosaic map would be a
highly detailed cellular tower dump, and innocent individuals would be de-
prived of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. The mere existence of the
technology does not mean that it will be used in a negative manner. How-
ever, to best protect the citizens of the United States, the Government has the
responsibility to take affirmative steps to limit the availability of a negative
use-whether or not it has been utilized.144
V. THE CURRENT LAW LIMITING THE FEDERAL
OVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO PERFORM CELLULAR
PHONE TRACKING AND DATA INVASION
The current laws are insufficient to protect the tracking and data inva-
sion of an individual's cellular phone. Protection from tracking and data sur-
veillance stems from three sources: (1) the First Amendment; (2) Fourth
Amendment; and (3) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
These sources are inadequately defined and do not protect Americans from
the invasive surveillance that occurs from government meddling.
A. The First Amendment
Usually, the First Amendment is associated with the freedoms of
speech, press, religion, and assembly.145 While these rights are no less de-
serving in modern times, they are not of urgent concern. The last 200 years
of First Amendment interpretations have shown the importance of the right to
express oneself through oral and written word. The Supreme Court has spent
a significant portion of its docket working through classic First Amendment
concerns, such as those presented in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and
140. Id. at 628.
141. United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 998-99 (D. Ariz) (2012).
142. Crocker, supra note 107, at 628, n.66.
143. Id. at 634; see also Sinha, supra note 52, at 896.
144. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (Foreign Intelligence Survey Ct. of Review 2008).
145. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.146 However, because cellu-
lar phone surveillance has enhanced the Government's ability to track an
individual's movements, this technology challenges the First Amendment's
ability to protect an individual's rights to assemble in a whole new way.
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."l47 The Constitution reserves to the people the right to assemble in a
peaceful fashion. However, this right is impeded when the Government con-
stantly surveils.148 The Government's ability to monitor and record an indi-
vidual's location creates the opportunity for the individual's association and
assembly activities to be infringed.
Currently, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has had an opportu-
nity to address the effect that the determination of an individual's association
through location information has on the First Amendment. However, in Citi-
zens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court discussed
the importance of interpreting the First Amendment in a way that allows it to
apply in a variety of situations.149 The Court remarked that the First Amend-
ment is best interpreted when it is given "breathing space" to properly adapt
to an ever-changing field of law.150
Under a loose constructionist view of the Constitution, the Constitution
itself would be able to conform to new issues that may violate the First
Amendment. Therefore, it is foreseeable that the First Amendment itself
would restrict the Government's ability to monitor the public through cellular
phones. On the other hand, a strict constructionist interpretation of the Con-
stitution provides little to no protection from the Government's invasion
through cellular phones. While these interpretations lead to drastically differ-
ent outcomes, neither sufficiently protect a citizen's privacy. Even the loosest
interpretation of the First Amendment would still be limited to varying inter-
pretations of the words of the Amendment. Thus, it is the words of the First
Amendment itself that limit its applicability to technological issues and cre-
ate an impermissible barrier that can only be resolved by a congressional
statute addressing these issues.
146. See generally, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. See id.
149. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 329.
150. Id.
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B. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was created to protect an individual's right to
privacy, and once was seen as the beaconing light for that protection.151
However, it has now faded into an inadequate safeguard. In fact, some courts
have found that, since an individual should not "reasonably expect" privacy
while using their personal phone, the Fourth Amendment does not protect
the acquisition of location data at all.152 While the logic behind the theory
that the Fourth Amendment is not infringed when the Government acquires
location data seems sound, it crumbles on itself with the realities of tracking
technology and the Government's long-reaching arm. The decrease in consti-
tutional protection, combined with the conflicting judicial interpretations of
whether the Fourth Amendment is violated by the interception of location
information, highlights the need for a reexamination of the current laws.153
One plausible explanation for this decrease in protection is the ever-
changing idea of property. Originally, the "property" that the Fourth Amend-
ment sought to protect was physical property, such as a house.154 But today,
advancements in law and technology have evolved the concept of property
into an entity that was unimaginable at its creation. Particularly, the clause
that provides protection for Americans to be "secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects" at most envisioned the protection of the highest form of
invasion at that time: looting and rummaging through an individual's
home.155 A pragmatic approach to the Constitution suggests this Constitu-
tional protection was intended to expand with the progression and evolution
of America. Such a theory is bolstered by considering that the revolution
leading to our advanced technology was unthinkable by the Founding Fathers
and consequently left unaddressed.
The Fourth Amendment's inability to conform to the modern American
society is nonsensical; it requires no more to search an individual's trunk
than it does to track an individual's exact location. This flawed result occurs
from the Fourth Amendment's language that requires a warrant only to
search an individual's property,1 56 but courts have even bypassed this thresh-
old requirement.1 57 This blanket warrant requirement fails to consider the ne-
cessity of tailoring protection to different forms of property, which produce
151. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
152. United States v. Woodley, No. 13-113, 2015 WL 5136173, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 1, 2015).
153. See id.
154. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015); see also
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513 (11th Cir. 2015); Woodley, No. 13-
113, 2015 WL 5136173, at *9.
157. See generally id.
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varying degrees of constitutional infringement. To have the same low stan-
dard to acquire a warrant for an individual's file cabinet as for their physical
body seems illogical and unethical considering the massive amount of inno-
cent individuals that are incidentally swept up in the process. Yet, nothing
prohibits these types of government action since the Fourth Amendment uni-
formly applies to all actions.
The evolution of cellular phone tracking is a pivotal issue with federal
courts continually analyzing the complexity of a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion due to cellular location tracking with and without a warrant. 58 At its
creation, the Fourth Amendment was only, and could only be, drafted to pro-
tect the property concerns of the day, such as a chair, cabinet, or house. This
elementary protection is key to understanding the creation of the Fourth
Amendment and the reason why it is no longer providing Americas with the
needed protection in the world of technology.
C. Electronic Communication Privacy Act
After severe privacy breaches from wiretaps, Congress acknowledged
the lack of public protection from the advanced surveillance permitted under
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA).159 The ECPA was en-
acted in 1986 under 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22.160 This Act is composed of both
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act and the Stored Wire Electronic
Communications Act, which together are singularly referred to as Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.161 Generally, the ECPA protects wire,
oral, and electronic communication when it is created, transmitted, and
stored.162 Notably, this Act is not designed to protect cellular phone surveil-
lance. While this is an interrelated field, the ECPA was enacted at a time
when cellular phones were still in a stage of infancy.163
The ECPA controls the Government's ability to compel cellular phone
providers to release electronic communication, such as calling records.164 Al-
though the ECPA is a step in the right direction to provide adequate protec-
158. See Graham, 796 F.3d at 345-51; see also Woodley, No. 13-1 13, 2015 WL
5136173, at *9.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008).
160. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2008).
161. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, JUSTICE INFORMATION SHAR-
ING, https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1285 (last visited Nov.
16, 2015).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
163. Zachary M. Seward, The First Mobile Phone Call Was Made 40 Years Ago
Today, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/201 3/04/the-first-mobile-phone-call-was-made-40-years-ago-today/
274611/.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
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tions with respect to cellular phone surveillance, over time two critical
structural issues have appeared. First, "the frequency with which the Govern-
ment obtains orders under inconsistent (and relatively undemanding) stan-
dards. Second, the secrecy and lack of review surrounding these orders."65
The ECPA is plagued with unworkable issues. For instance, the ECPA
requires reasonable suspicion or probable cause to obtain location informa-
tion, but the definition of either standard is not understood.166 In addition,
there is confusion as to what standard the Government must meet when seek-
ing to obtain location information as the ECPA does not apply directly to
cellular phone technology.167
It is likely that the Government files the majority of requests under the
less stringent standard of reasonable suspicion168 This is not surprising be-
cause logically, when providing two standards and when one is more easily
satisfied than the other, there will be a higher usage of the easier-to-meet
standard. This leads to inconsistency and unfairness in the ECPA's applica-
tion. "The inconsistent and increasingly fractured standards for obtaining lo-
cation data under ECPA have led commentators and civil liberties groups to
bemoan the state of the law and call for judicial and legislative reform."69 As
a solution to this inconsistency, the Supreme Court should "require probable
cause, or Congress could add language codifying the forms of location data
and clarifying more specific application of ECPA authorities."170 This would
eliminate the Government's ability to select a less rigorous standard, thus
creating a uniform and a fair application of the ECPA.171
In addition, the ECPA does not require that the Government notify the
individual whose activity is being monitored.172 There are two issues that
arise from this "secret" surveillance. First, there lack of legal notice to the
victim. Throughout cellular phone surveillance is the lack of judicial protec-
tion provided to an individual due to the lack of notice required to file a
suit.173 Thus, a circular reaction occurs from the lack of notice given to indi-
viduals by producing a lack of judicial progress governing cellular phone
technology. This is because litigants are not able to bring a suit, which shows
the Government's deliberate ignorance of constitutional infringement. Sec-
165. Crocker, supra note 107, at 630.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2009).
167. Crocker, supra note 107, at 630.
168. Id. at 631.
169. Id. at 633.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 634.
173. Crocker, supra note 107, at 634.
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ond, surveillance conducted in secret decreases in public discourse about
these methods.174
The 111th Congress addressed the need for electronic privacy reform by
amending the ECPA because, in its current state, it lacks the level of protec-
tion required to safeguard citizen's rights in the digital age.1 75 Congress de-
signed the ECPA to protect a citizens' use of electronic devices, but as digital
devices evolved, Congress has failed to reform the ECPA accordingly.176 The
chairman of the committee assigned to address the reformation of the ECPA
remarked "bringing this privacy law into the digital age will be one of Con-
gress's greatest challenges."l77 He further explained that the law is plagued
with many conflicting standards that create uncertainty in its application.178
While nearly five years have passed since the acknowledgment of the
ECPA's inadequacy, Congress has not yet attempted to fix these issues
through reform.179
The First and Fourth Amendments, as well as the ECPA, were enacted
prior to the development of cellular phones and, therefore, none of these
expressly apply to cellular phone technology.8o It is necessary that Congress
affirmatively enact new laws to further Constitutional protections in this area.
A law that clearly extends the rights of the First and Fourth Amendments
through judicial action, and congressional enactment of law with the Amend-
ments' underlying policy concerns of public discourse, public congregation,
and privacy of communication will efficiently and effectively correct the
Constitution's impeding corrosion. An essential aspect of the U.S. govern-
ment is the ability for the Constitution to adapt to an evolving society and for
Congress to enact statutes where the Constitution does not speak.181
D. Benefits of the Government Tracking Cellular Phones
There are legitimate purposes for tracking cellular phones, but tracking
technology must be limited to emergency and statutorily approved purposes.
Tracking technology can serve the legitimate purpose of keeping individuals
174. Id. at 639.
175. Kirsten Koepsel et al., Should the Electronic Communications Privacy Act







179. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 161.
180. Crocker, supra note 107, at 631.
181. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1886).
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safe in the event of an emergency.1 82 For example, emergency responders are
able to locate an individual because of the Federal Communication Commis-
sion rule that requires a precise location in emergency situations.183 The idea
behind this requirement is that in an emergency situation, a cellular phone is
likely to be with the individual and the ability to expeditiously locate their
cellular phone could save lives.184 According to current laws, the Constitu-
tion is not unreasonably threatened by the use of this technology for an emer-
gency situation.185 However, the use of this same technology for a different
purpose, such as locating a suspect, risks violating an individual's constitu-
tional rights.186
VI. ENACTMENT OF A STATUTE IS THE BEST SOLUTION TO
DETER INFRINGEMENT OF FIRST AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Because currently the laws enacted inadequately protect individual's
First and Fourth Amendment rights, Congress has an obligation to remedy
these issues.187 In fact, federal circuit courts have recognized the need for
legislative reform while making the grim constitutional rulings.188 For in-
stance, in Davis, the Supreme Court stated,
[P]roposals should be directed to Congress and the state legisla-
tures rather than to the federal courts. As aptly stated by the Fifth
Circuit, "the recourse for these desires is in the market or the po-
litical process; in demanding that service providers do away with
such records (or anonymize them) or in lobbying elected repre-
sentatives to enact statutory protections.189
Neither the Constitution nor the ECPA adequately addresses the issue of cel-
lular phone's invasion into American lives.190 The problem created with cel-
lular phones is too unique and complex of an issue to be addressed by
statutes indirectly. In the past, statutes that have looked to fix this issue have
done so by compiling it with other electronic issues.191 However, a statute
182. Crocker, supra note 107, at 626.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 622.
186. Id. at 637.
187. See id. at 630.
188. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015).
189. Id.
190. Crocker, supra note 107, at 630.
191. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 161 (estab-
lishes that the ECPA applies to email, telephone, and data stored).
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must address this issue specifically in order to respond to the complexity of
cell phone surveillance.
A statute that focuses solely on cellular phones needs to be enacted. It
should focus on the ability of cellular phones to track the location of an
individual and limit the Government's ability to obtain this information. This
would not be the first time that Congress used a statute to focus solely on one
form of technology. The Omnibus Bill for example, focused solely on wire-
taps.1 92 Thus, Congress is urged to act in accordance with its procedure in
addressing wiretaps. In that instance, Congress recognized the gap in applica-
ble law and its need to remedy the issue. Enacting a statute for cellular phone
surveillance does not require too much of Congress in their representation of
the American public.
There are egregious wrongs that occur as a result of tracking an individ-
ual's location and Congress has the responsibility to fix this issue in order to
fulfill their obligation to the American public. The Fourth Amendment is
clearly infringed by the direct invasion of an individual's privacy when their
cellular phones are tracked.193 Further, the First Amendment is indirectly in-
fringed upon when the Government compiles the location of an individual
because the location of an individual reveals their association.194 The pro-
posed name for this bill is The National Cellular Tower Surveillance Act
(NCTSA). Limiting technology is illogical and not in the best interest of our
society. Therefore, the Government must be prohibited from using the tech-
nology in an unconstitutional manner.
Under the NCTSA, the Government would be limited in several regards
to cellular phone surveillance. In most instances, the Government would be
limited to requesting information from cellular phone providers only on sus-
pects to prevent a cellular tower dump. However, if it were necessary for the
Government to acquire a mass collection of cellular phone information, then
the Government would have to satisfy a higher standard of proof. This di-
rectly considers the Government's potential constitutional interference to de-
termine the correct process that it must take to retrieve location information.
192. See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Jus-
TICE INFORMATION SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/stat
utes/1284 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
193. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; see also Crocker, supra note 107, at 634-36 (ar-
guing that the current state of the Fourth Amendment is not adequately protect-
ing against the direct invasion of individual privacy through cellular phone
tracking).
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Crocker, supra note 107, at 636 (arguing
that First Amendment rights may be implicated when tracking cellular phone
activity).
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A. Substantive Solution
Under the current law, the standard of proof to obtain a warrant is prob-
able cause.1 95 However, due to the high possibility that constitutional in-
fringement can occur from tracking cellular phones, a higher standard should
be adopted. Raising the standard of proof for cellular tracking is necessary in
order to protect the public from unnecessary searches and seizures. This solu-
tion proposes that a court weigh the Government's interest in tracking with
the individual's constitutional right to both privacy and anonymous associa-
tion. This requires a dramatic change from the current standard, which only
requires the Government to show that there is some evidence to support the
acquisition of the information.196 The change in the standard of proof will
faithfully guard an individual's privacy and right to free speech.
In fact, the increased standard of proof aligns with the Government's
standard of proof for First Amendment violations.197 The Supreme Court
holds that for the Government to infringe upon the First Amendment by re-
vealing the membership list of an organization it must prove to have a com-
pelling interest in the revelation.198 Clearly, raising the standard of proof
needed to acquire location information, which could potentially infringe
upon an individual's constitutional rights, is nothing new.
Notably, precedent has shown that a higher standard is normal and ad-
visable. For instance, the standard for the NCTSA lies between the probable
cause standard and the without a reasonable doubt standard. A fusion of these
standards would require a more thorough analysis before granting permission
to collect innocent individuals' location data, while also providing a manage-
able standard when a cellular tower dump is legitimately needed to capture a
suspect. Similar to the Omnibus Act's provision, this standard is kept practi-
cal by only increasing the burden of proof when innocent individuals are
involved.199 The Government's procedure will only require a higher standard
in those cases were more than a suspected individual could fall victim to
unconstitutionality. In all other cases, the Government will follow the proce-
dure already in place.
In the alternative, if Congress believes it too burdensome to require a
higher burden of proof, then a detailed description of additional procedural
requirements, as in the Omnibus Acts, should be a part of the NCTSA.200
This list would outline the step-by-step procedure that the Government must
follow to acquire location information. This guide would help solve some of
195. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 (1964).
196. Id.
197. Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
198. Id.





the uncertainty in the ECPA. The NCTSA would effectively and properly
balance the innocent persons First and Fourth Amendment rights and the
Government's interest in apprehending suspects. It will also create the oppor-
tunity for Congress to address analogous issues with cellular phones, such as
data invasion, in the future. Because of the current laws inconsistencies and
inefficiencies, Congress is urged to enact a comprehensive statute that di-
rectly addresses the issue of broad cellular tower dumps infringing upon the
First and Fourth Amendments.
B. Procedural Solution
Another hindrance to bringing a claim against the Government's inva-
sion of an individual's First and Fourth Amendment's rights through cellular
phone tracking is the inability to establish notice, standing, and a proper rem-
edy, which are all required to bring suit. If the Government restricts an indi-
vidual's access to any of these three requirements, a suit for breaching an
individual's constitutional right can never be brought.
i. Notice
Since the Government does not notify each individual whose data is
swept up in a cellular tower dump that their location data has been revealed,
the individual does not have notice.201 Without bringing this information to
the individual's attention, the Government violates that person's rights be-
cause they are unaware of the potential for a suit on constitutional grounds.202
Because of the large quantity of information received through cellular tower
dumps, it seems neither efficient nor effective to require the Government to
notify each individual of the dump. But if the Government did notify each
individual, the amount of suits actually brought will likely be lower. How-
ever, regardless of the inefficiency, individuals lack the notice necessary to
challenge the acquisition of their location data in court.203
ii. Remedy
Even in the rare event an individual is given notice of location tracking,
he or she "can only challenge the use of this data to the extent that existing
law provides a remedy."204 It seems that, under current law, there is not a
proper remedy for the courts to award. The ECPA does not provide a remedy
to suppress the use of location data, thereby directly contradicting the Ameri-
can judicial system by leaving citizens without a method of relief.205 The
likely remedy under the current law would be for the individual to seek an
201. Crocker, supra note 107, at 639.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 639.
205. 18 U.S.C § 2511 (2015).
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injunction against the Government to prevent further invasion.206 However,
the NCTSA should provide whatever relief Congress deems necessary.
iii. Standing
In addition to notice and remedy, the standing doctrine is also a barrier
to a First and Fourth Amendment claim.207 Historically, standing is an issue
for an individual that wants to bring a constitutional claim.208 Generally, this
is because a constitutional issue often applies to a wide variety of individuals
without an obvious injury.209 Regardless of the difficulty in establishing
standing, the Supreme Court and Congress have not addressed this hurdle.
To satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff must bring a claim that
shows harm.210 The dichotomy in interpreting standing is provided in Laird v.
Tatum, which further explains the issue with the standing doctrine.211 The
narrow interpretation of standing in Laird is to view the reduction of free
speech as a harm to establish standing.212 However, the actual application of
the holding by lower courts shows a different interpretation and allows for
the reduction of free speech to satisfy the standing requirement.213
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a concrete injury sufficient
to satisfy the standing requirement results from a drop in active participation
and membership.214 In Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, Justice
Marshall accuses the Government of applying the Laird holding too broadly
and asserts that an injury, such as membership loss, is sufficient to overcome
the procedural threshold issue.215 Thus, the litigants need only show, through
objective data, that an action taken by the Government has affected its organ-
ization's membership or attendance numbers. If this form of harm is recog-
nized, the claim is more viable because the chilling of speech and the
decrease of membership in an association are likely results of the Govern-
ment's invasion on speech and privacy.
After satisfying these three procedural issues, there is the question of
whether the Supreme Court would even consider addressing the issue. The
206. Id.
207. Crocker, supra note 107, at 640.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
211. Crocker, supra note 107, at 639-40 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15
(1972)).
212. Id.
213. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 660 (6th Cir. 2007); see also United Presby-
terian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984).




Court limits its review of constitutional issues by narrowly construing the
question of certification. Historically, the Court has avoided addressing a
constitutional issue by resolving the problem on other grounds. It is these
bleak conditions that an individual must face to even have the opportunity to
have the Court address the protection of their constitutional rights in the
modern world of cellular phone surveillance.
After recognizing the many barriers one must overcome and the confu-
sion within each procedural hurdle, it becomes even more apparent that it is
necessary for Congress to enact a precise statutory solution. The enactment
of the NCTSA that directly addresses the First and Fourth Amendments
should require that the Government to give notice to all individuals, create a
statutory remedy, and establish standing when a chilling effect is proven. The
NCTSA should give every citizen his or her constitutional right to a day in
court.
This Comment urges Congress to follow its precedent of the Wiretap-
ping Act and enact a statute to protect Americans against cellular phone sur-
veillance. While the Court could still deny certification of the issue because a
statute that an individual can file suit under exists, it is less likely that the
Court will even face the issue. The statute will nip the problem in the bud
before it comes to fruition.
A statute addressing this new invasive form of surveillance fits with the
natural progression of our society. Just as Congress acted with the Wiretap-
ping Act and it is urged to follow suit with cellular phone surveillance.216
This progression is logical because the same policy issues faced by the
American public with cellular surveillance were faced with wiretapping-
invasion of privacy, the ability to reveal anonymity and associational ties,
and the potential to chill speech. While these injuries are speculative in na-
ture, these are the exact rights that the Constitution seeks to protect. The
Supreme Court has recognized these dangers in Jones and therefore these
surveillance methods must be limited.217 The best form of limitation would
be for Congress to enact a statute that directly addresses cellular phone sur-
veillance and the Government's limitations, much like that of NCTSA.
VII. CONCLUSION
The First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution were not created
to face the issue of cellular phones surveillance. Similarly, the ECPA was
only created to protect cellular phone users and does not provide additional
protections. Congress has repeatedly recognized the Constitution's limitation
in protecting U.S. citizens' rights. Congress attempted to regulate other types
of technology, but has failed to do so for cellular phones. For instance, the
Wiretap Act was enacted to combat the executive branch's ability to perform
216. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
217. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
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wiretaps. Thus, creating a statute to supplement the Constitution to address
the cellular phone surveillance is a natural extension.
While nothing directly precludes the Government's ability to track an
individual's location through his cellular phone, the intent of the First and
Fourth Amendments directly and indirectly prohibit an unjustified invasion
of privacy. The First Amendment embraces an individual's right to speak
freely without worrying about negative repercussions and encourages an in-
dividual to associate with who he may choose. Further, the Fourth Amend-
ment is meant to protect a citizen's right to privacy. The Fourth Amendment
also includes the right to have privacy in one's lives. Congress should fulfill
the Founding Fathers' hopes of protecting a citizen's right to privacy and
speech by enacting a statute that limits the Government's ability to surveil
cellular phones.
Together the First and Fourth Amendment craft a life for every Ameri-
can that can be uniquely his own. The Constitution allows an individual to
live exactly how he desires without the fear of reprisal. The ability of the
U.S. government to track an individual's movements through a cellular
phone directly contravenes this policy. It is the responsibility of Congress to
address this issue. The NCTSA should provide the protection that Americans
deserve. Hopefully in time, U.S. government will adjust the scales of Lady




Question: "If the government has the ability to track your personal cellular
phone's location would this lead you to take a second thought about the
activities or groups that you chose to associate with?"
Age # of Yes #of No
21-40 12 13
40-60 4
60-80 2
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